German & Russian Defensive Tactics

It is almost axiomatic that a defensive position should incorporate at least some mobile elements to reinforce threatened points; to make counter penetrations (that is, to block holes that may develop); to make counter-attacks (in other words, to carry out a direct strike on the attacking enemy) or to implement counter strikes.

The classic German defensive doctrines that emerged in the middle of World War I stipulated a dense belt (or ‘archipelago’) of defensive strongpoints, perhaps 10km in depth, each of which would include a mobile force to react in one of a number of other ways. The enemy would be not so much ‘beaten off’ by a front line, as ‘enmeshed and smothered’ inside an all enveloping hostile area.

In the battle of Kursk. July 1943, the Russians first halted the German assaults within a very similar ‘web’ of infantry and anti-tank strong points, laid out sometimes more than 100Km in depth and supported by obstacles and minefields. The defending forces ground the attackers down by the depth and complexity of the defenses, then mounted a major counter attack with large, fresh, armored forces that pushed the Germans far back behind their original start line. It is this concept which is still at the root of their ideas of ‘defensive defense ‘ in the era of perestroika.

From 1943 onwards the Germans lacked the resources necessary to lay out defenses on the same scale as the Russian positions at Kursk; nor could they launch similarly decisive counter moves. Nevertheless they did perfect an economical system of mobile defense, under which the front line was relatively fragile but offered concentrated armored forces from the rear. The enemy would be lured forward and then struck hard by this armor after the initial impetus of the attack had been lost. In this way generals such as Erich von Manstein made the Soviets pay dearly for their tactical advances, even though the outnumbered Germans could never hope to restore their front line entirely once it had been breached.

Just as Russian defensive tactics today are inspired by the Kursk model, von Manstein’s ‘fire brigade’ concept of mobile defense has been carefully studied by many of the NATO armies as a model for their Own defensives.

‘Doctrine’ may he expressed as the ideas and expectations with which soldiers are trained to enter battle and then fight through it, and it should not be underestimated as an element of battle. If troops have poor doctrine and training, even their best weapons will be defeated, but with sound doctrine even badly equipped soldiers may achieve great overall results.

Beyond the doctrines of the offensive and the defensive, success in battle depends on the technical tactical balance between the two sides in that battle. Wars tend to bog down when conditions are such that an initially favorable attack is unable to finish off the enemy with a single blow.

The British Army’s much vaunted ability to control the Empire with small detachments of troops was earned in equal measure by discipline and equipment. Trained soldiers, armed with breech loading rifles and primitive rapid-fire weapons, could easily defeat men used to more basic forms of weaponry.

The Gatling Gun saw service with the British Army during the 2nd Afghan War (1878-1880). It made mass attacks by insurrectionary tribesmen into suicidal affairs, just as its successor, the Maxim gun was during the Sudanese War, 20 years later. There, Kitchener’s troops killed more than ten thousand Mandists for the loss of less than five hundred of their own.

That this same weapon of mass destruction could also act against them, as it would during World War I, seemed to escape the strategists when a force is deployed to attack too large an enemy. In other cases, however, the failure to win a decisive result will have more to do with the technical tactical balance than with the numerical or strategic one. In both World War I and the more recent Iran Iraq War, the fighting bogged down because the tactical attacker was unable to sustain his momentum and mobility through the whole depth of the enemy’s defense’s. His forces were too vulnerable when they moved, so they had to dig in and stay put.

The tactical balance between two sides is decided by the relationship of four characteristics: firepower, mobility, protection and the quality of the troops that each side has deployed. If firepower is heavy against poor troops with low mobility and protection, they will be unable to advance, whereas shaky or badly deployed defenders with low firepower will be unable to stop a rapid armored advance by well trained soldiers.